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[ Country-by-Country Reports ]
BURMA (TIER 3)
[Extracted from U.S. State Dept Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2009]
Burma
is a source country for women, children, and men trafficked for the purpose
of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation. Burmese women and
children are trafficked to Thailand, the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and South Korea for commercial
sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, and forced labor. Some Burmese
migrating abroad for better economic opportunities wind up in situations of
forced or bonded labor or forced prostitution. Burmese children in Thailand
are subjected to conditions of forced labor as hawkers, beggars, and for work
in shops, agriculture, fish processing, or other small-scale industries.
Women are trafficked to China for forced marriage and to Malaysia and China
for commercial sexual exploitation. Men and women are trafficked to Thailand
and Malaysia for forced labor. Some trafficking victims transit Burma from
Bangladesh to Malaysia, and from the PRC to Thailand and beyond.
Trafficking
within Burma is a significant phenomenon. Villagers from rural areas move to
urban centers and economic hubs along the borders with Thailand and China for
labor in industrial zones and agricultural estates, and are trafficked into
conditions of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation. Trafficking in
girls for the purpose of prostitution persisted as a major problem,
particularly in urban areas. Burma is a destination country for child sex
tourism. Government and military use of forced labor remained widespread,
reportedly targeting members of ethnic minority groups. Urban poor and street
children in Rangoon and Mandalay are at risk of involuntary conscription as
child soldiers by the Burmese junta. Thousands of children are forced to
serve in Burma’s national army as desertions of men in the army rise.
Some children were threatened with jail if they did not agree to join the
army. Poor villagers in rural regions must provide corvee labor on
demand as a tax imposed by authorities. Ethnic insurgent groups also used
compulsory labor of adults and engaged in the unlawful recruitment of child
soldiers. After Cyclone Nargis devastated Burma in May 2008, there were
anecdotal reports of trafficking of cyclone victims to other parts of Burma
and to neighboring countries. There was also a dramatic increase in the
number of unverified reports of forced labor, including of children, and
trafficking in persons after the cyclone. The military junta’s gross
economic mismanagement, human rights abuses, and its continued widespread use
of forced labor are among the top causal factors for Burma’s
significant trafficking problem.
In
some areas, including in particular the international trafficking of women
and children for commercial sexual exploitation, the Government of Burma is
making significant efforts. Available data indicated an increase in law
enforcement efforts in 2008, a considerable increase in budget allocation for
anti-trafficking activities, and the establishment of three anti-trafficking
police units. Overall, however, serious problems remain, and in some areas,
most notably in the area of forced labor, the Government of Burma is not
making significant efforts to comply with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking, warranting a ranking of Tier 3. Specifically,
military and civilian officials remain directly involved in forced labor and
the unlawful conscription of child soldiers, with reported cases of child
soldiers increasing annually. Furthermore, the regime has not yet adequately
addressed the phenomena of trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation and
labor exploitation within the country.
Recommendations for Burma: Criminally prosecute military and civilian officials
responsible for forced labor and the conscription of child soldiers; improve
efforts to cease the practice of forced labor of Burmese citizens by civilian
and military entities; continue to increase prosecutions and convictions for
internal trafficking; continue collaboration in addressing forced labor and
sex trafficking with international NGOs and international organizations in a
transparent and accountable manner; complete development and implementation
of formal victim identification and referral procedures to identify victims of
trafficking; undertake additional initiatives to prevent trafficking, such as
instituting a public awareness campaign to warn at-risk populations of the
dangers of trafficking; and focus more attention on internal trafficking of
females for commercial sexual exploitation.
Prosecution
The Burmese junta demonstrated a degree of progress to combat transnational
trafficking throughout the past year. There were limited efforts to
investigate or prosecute cases of internal trafficking. While the government
administratively punished perpetrators of some trafficking crimes, criminal
punishment remained weak. Burma prohibits sex and labor trafficking through
its 2005 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law, which prescribes criminal penalties
that are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for
rape. Military recruitment of children under 18 is prohibited by Armed Forces
Notification number 13/73 from 1974, but the military has not criminally
prosecuted under the Penal Code those who recruit child soldiers, instead
reportedly sanctioning them with administrative penalties. The government
also failed to criminally punish civilian or military perpetrators of forced
labor. Laws prohibiting child prostitution were also not enforced
effectively. The Burmese junta rules arbitrarily through its unilaterally
imposed laws, but rule of law is absent, as is an independent judiciary that
would respect trafficking victims’ rights and provide fair justice. The
Burmese regime reported that it investigated and prosecuted 127 cases of
trafficking, identifying and convicting 342 suspected traffickers in 2008.
However, court proceedings are not open and lack due process for defendants.
In the past, data claimed to represent trafficking in persons issues has
often included individuals caught trying to leave Burma without permission.
While the Burmese regime has been known to conflate irregular migration with
trafficking, leading to the punishment of consensual emigrants and those who
assist them to emigrate, during the reporting period, the police made some
efforts to exclude smuggling cases from human trafficking figures. If persons
are internally trafficked for labor by a high-level official or
well-connected individual, the police can be expected to self-limit their
investigations, even if no political pressure has been overtly employed.
Burmese law enforcement officers joined PRC counterparts to jointly
investigate 11 cross-border trafficking cases. The Ministry of Home Affairs
continued to maintain that there was no complicity of regime officials in
trafficking; however, corruption among local government officials was
widespread, and officials frequently engage in corrupt practices with
impunity. During the year, the regime reported two officials were prosecuted
for their involvement in trafficking cases, and sentenced to three years in
prison. The Ministry of Labor in 2008 issued licenses to 108 companies to
recruit workers for overseas jobs. Since 2008, the Ministry of Labor
cancelled the licenses of 14 companies for legal violations. In 2008, the ILO
Liaison Officer accepted 64 formal complaints and submitted all of them to
the Burmese government for action. In 2008, the government did not criminally
prosecute any cases of forced labor; instead, it dismissed one civilian administrative
official who subjected others to forced labor, reprimanded seven others, and
reprimanded 21 military officials for subjecting others to forced labor.
Three of the 64 cases referred by the ILO are still pending.
Protection
The Burmese regime made some efforts to protect repatriated victims of
cross-border sex trafficking, but exhibited limited efforts to protect
victims of forced labor and internal sex trafficking exploited within
Burma’s borders. Over the past year, the Burmese government reportedly
assisted 232 victims, 133 of whom were identified and repatriated by the Thai
government, 98 of whom were identified and repatriated by PRC authorities,
and one who was identified by Jamaican authorities. The government reportedly
identified 14 Chinese women and girls who were being trafficked into Thailand
for sexual exploitation. The Burmese regime does not have in place formal
victim identification procedures to identify victims of trafficking among
vulnerable groups. In forced labor cases, victims were sometimes harassed,
detained, or otherwise penalized for making accusations against the officials
who subjected them into forced labor. In the past, the junta has filed
charges against those who assist claimants of forced labor, including their
legal counsel and witnesses, though no such cases were reported during the
year. Such harassment and punishment discourages others from coming forward
to report abuses. Burmese and foreign trafficking victims stayed in
government-run shelter facilities for up to one month before being returned
to their home communities. The regime does not provide legal assistance to
victims. The government encourages internationally trafficked victims to
assist in investigations and prosecutions. The government extended for an
additional year the 2007 Supplementary Understanding on Forced Labor, which
establishes a mechanism for forced labor complaints and provides protections
for those who reported cases to the ILO. In 2008, the junta showed some
cooperation with international organizations on the issue of the
military’s conscription of children, resulting in the return of 21
children to their families. However, the regime did not permit UNICEF access
to children who were released for follow-up purposes. Although the recruiting
officers were sanctioned with administrative punishments, the military has
not criminally prosecuted the perpetrators of child soldier recruitment under
applicable Burmese law.
Prevention
The government increased efforts to prevent international trafficking in
persons, but made only limited efforts to address the trafficking that occurs
within the country’s borders. The National Police conducted 238
awareness campaigns reaching over 25,000 people. The Burmese junta reported
that it significantly increased spending in 2008 on anti-trafficking efforts,
including prevention, educational awareness, funding of additional
anti-trafficking police, and protection efforts. Police officials established
three new anti-trafficking units, including two in the Irrawaddy Delta in an
attempt to deter trafficking cases. The government also established an
anti-trafficking office within the Border Liaison Office along the
Burma-China border in Kachin State. During the year, the government worked
with an NGO and the UN to train officials on differences between smuggling
and trafficking, and about Burma’s trafficking law and its enforcement.
The Ministry of Home Affairs in collaboration with an international
organization conducted awareness raising campaigns at bus terminals, targeting
drivers, merchants, ticket sellers, and local police. The government posted
billboards and notices at hotels aimed at tourists to warn about trafficking.
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